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1ARTICLE V:  MEASURES TO REDRESS A SITUATION
AND TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE
by Nicholas A Sims†
Introduction
1.   The Ad Hoc Group (AHG) is considering measures to strengthen the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) through a legally binding instrument.  The pace of the
AHG negotiations has quickened during the past year and there is now a clear political will to
see the negotiation of the Protocol completed as soon as possible before the Fifth Review
Conference in 2001.    It is now evident that several Articles in the draft Protocol are now
largely agreed and will not develop significantly from their current form although a certain
amount of restructuring may be agreed at a later stage.
2.   In Evaluation Paper No 1 it was concluded1 that "the majority of the Articles in the draft
Protocol have now reached the stage when they have had multiple readings and are unlikely
to change significantly during the coming months as the negotiations enter the end-game.   It
is therefore timely to commence the production of a series of Evaluation Papers which will
consider Article by Article the current state of each Article of the Protocol."   This Evaluation
Paper continues this series by considering Article V Measures to Redress a Situation and to
Ensure Compliance  on which the AHG has made good progress with the current rolling text
containing three sets of square brackets.
Article V
3.   In October 1999, the text2 for Article V was unchanged from its earlier version and was as
follows:
ARTICLE V
MEASURES TO REDRESS A SITUATION AND TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE
1. The Conference shall take the necessary measures, in accordance with paragraphs
2, 3 and 4, to ensure compliance with the Convention and this Protocol and to redress
and remedy any situation which contravenes their provisions. In considering action
pursuant to this paragraph, the Conference shall take into account all information
and recommendations on the issues submitted by the Executive Council.
2. In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Conference or by the
Executive Council, taking into account their respective powers and functions, to take
measures to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance, and
where the State Party fails to fulfil the request within the specified time, the
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2United Nations, Procedural Report of the Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on the
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and on their Destruction, BWC/AD HOC GROUP/47 (Part I), 15 October 1999, Geneva.
2Conference may, upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, inter alia,
restrict or suspend the State Party’s rights and privileges under this Protocol until the
Conference decides it has undertaken the necessary action to conform with its
obligations under the Convention and this Protocol.
3. In cases where serious damage to the object and purpose of the Convention may
result from non-compliance with the provisions of the Convention or this Protocol, in
particular Article I of the Convention, the Conference may recommend to States
Parties [collective] [joint] measures which are in conformity with international law
and designed to ensure the fulfilment of the object and purpose of the Convention.
4. The Conference or, alternatively, if the case is particularly grave and urgent, the
Executive Council, may bring the issue, including relevant information and
conclusions, to the attention of the [General Assembly [and] [or] the Security
Council of the] [relevant organs of the] United Nations.
4.  The strikethrough version of Article V provided3 by the FOC on Legal Issues for further
consideration proposes removal of the square brackets together with a streamlining of the
reference to the Convention as follows:
ARTICLE V
MEASURES TO REDRESS A SITUATION AND TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE
1. The Conference shall take the necessary measures, in accordance with paragraphs
2, 3 and 4, to ensure compliance with the Convention and this Protocol and to redress
and remedy any situation which contravenes their provisions. In considering action
pursuant to this paragraph, the Conference shall take into account all information
and recommendations on the issues submitted by the Executive Council.
2. In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Conference or by the
Executive Council, taking into account their respective powers and functions, to take
measures to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance, and
where the State Party fails to fulfil the request within the specified time, the
Conference may, upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, inter alia,
restrict or suspend the State Party’s rights and privileges under this Protocol until the
Conference decides it has undertaken the necessary action to conform with its
obligations under the Convention and this Protocol.
3. In cases where serious damage to the object and purpose of the Convention may
result from non-compliance with the provisions of the Convention or this Protocol, in
particular Article I of the Convention, the Conference may recommend to States
Parties cooperative [collective] [joint] measures which are in conformity with
international law and designed to ensure the fulfilment of the object and purpose of
the Convention.
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34. The Conference or, alternatively, if the case is particularly grave and urgent, the
Executive Council, may bring the issue, including relevant information and
conclusions, to the attention of the [General Assembly [and] [or] the Security
Council of the] [relevant organs of the] United Nations.
Evaluation
5.  The BTWC itself contains no specific Article on measures to redress a situation and to
ensure compliance.  States Parties to the BTWC do not constitute an organization of which
they are members, unlike the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW), the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty Organization (CTBTO) and the new
Organization envisaged by Article IX of the BTWC Protocol.   It is therefore left by
implication to the UN Security Council to take measures, since under the Convention there is
no BTWC Organization to do so.
6.  Under Article VI of the BTWC, States Parties "may lodge a complaint with the Security
Council of the United Nations.  Such a complaint should include all possible evidence
confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council."
The States Parties are under an obligation "to cooperate in carrying out any investigation
which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of
the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council."  Under Article VII
of the BTWC, they are also under an obligation "to provide or support assistance, in
accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so
requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a
result of violation of the Convention."
7.  Measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance would presumably be taken by
the Security Council, utilizing the obligations which all States Parties have assumed under
Articles VI and VII, after it had fulfilled its responsibility under the final sentence of Article
VI:  "The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of
the investigation."
8.  The provisions in the BTWC are not identical with an Article on measures to redress a
situation and to ensure compliance.  At most, it can be claimed that they are the nearest
approximations to such an Article in the absence of a treaty Organization of which the BTWC
States Parties constitute the membership.
9.  The Protocol Article V corresponds to Article XII of the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC)4:
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4ARTICLE XII
MEASURES TO REDRESS A SITUATION AND TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE,
 INCLUDING SANCTIONS
1. The Conference shall take the necessary measures, as set forth in paragraphs 2, 3
and 4, to ensure compliance with this Convention and to redress and remedy any
situation which contravenes the provisions of this Convention. In considering action
pursuant to this paragraph, the Conference shall take into account all information
and recommendations on the issues submitted by the Executive Council.
2. In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Executive Council to take
measures to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance, and
where the State Party fails to fulfil the request within the specified time, the
Conference may, inter alia, upon the recommendation of the Executive Council,
restrict or suspend the State Party's rights and privileges under this Convention until
it undertakes the necessary action to conform with its obligations under this
Convention.
3. In cases where serious damage to the object and purpose of this Convention may
result from activities prohibited under this Convention, in particular by Article I, the
Conference may recommend collective measures to States Parties in conformity with
international law.
4. The Conference shall in cases of particular gravity, bring the issue, including
relevant information and conclusions, to the attention of the United Nations General
Assembly and the United Nations Security Council.
and to Article V of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)5:
ARTICLE V
MEASURES TO REDRESS A SITUATION AND TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE,
INCLUDING SANCTIONS
1. The Conference, taking into account, inter alia, the recommendations of the
Executive Council, shall take the necessary measures, as set forth in paragraphs 2
and 3, to ensure compliance with this Treaty and to redress and remedy any situation
which contravenes the provisions of this Treaty.
2. In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Conference or the Executive
Council to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance and
fails to fulfil the request within the specified time, the Conference may, inter alia,
decide to restrict or suspend the State Party from the exercise of its rights and
privileges under this Treaty until the Conference decides otherwise.
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53. In cases where damage to the object and purpose of this Treaty may result from
non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty, the Conference may
recommend to States Parties collective measures which are in conformity with
international law.
4. The Conference, or alternatively, if the case is urgent, the Executive Council, may
bring the issue, including relevant information and conclusions, to the attention of the
United Nations.
10.  However, Article V of the Protocol omits the last two words of the titles of the CWC and
CTBT Articles "including sanctions".   It may be noted that the word sanctions occurs only in
the titles of those Articles and not in their provisions.  In the negotiation of both of those
treaties, there was general agreement that the sanctions open to the respective Organizations
they were in the process of establishing were severely limited.   Specifically excluded is the
sanction of expulsion -- paragraph 2 of Article IX The Organization of the draft Protocol
states that 2. All States Parties shall be members of the Organization. A State Party shall not
be deprived of its membership in the Organization. which is identical language to that in
CTBT Article II paragraph 1 and closely similar to CWC Article VIII paragraph 2 which
states that 2. All States Parties to this Convention shall be members of the Organization. A
State Party shall not be deprived of its membership in the Organization..  It would have been
unrealistic to provide in advance for the automatic imposition of particular measures, when
States  historically have found it so difficult to agree on measures to be imposed after the
event.  Not surprisingly, in both the CWC and the CTBT in Article XII and Article V
respectively end by passing the problem over to the United Nations.
11.   In Article V of the Protocol the remaining square brackets both relate to the United
Nations, directly in paragraph 4 and indirectly in paragraph 3.
Article V Paragraph 1
12.  This paragraph corresponds to paragraph 1 of Article XII of the CWC and to paragraph 1
of Article V of the CTBT.   It is noted that in the CTBT the reference to the Executive
Council is abbreviated, and what remains of it is included in the first and only sentence.
Article V Paragraph 2
13.   This paragraph corresponds to paragraph 2 of Article XII of the CWC and to paragraph 2
of Article V of the CTBT, but with several additions.
14.  One of these is the additions of the words "taking into account their respective powers
and functions" to balance the concession in paragraph 4 of a power granted to the Executive
Council which is not found at the same point in the CWC.  This point is discussed further
below under paragraph 4.
15.  In the CTBT, the Conference does not require an Executive Council recommendation in
order to exercise its powers of restriction or suspension of the exercise by a State Party of its
rights and privileges.   The Protocol language follows more closely the example of the CWC
thereby reflecting the experience gained thus far from the operation of the Executive Council
and the Conference of the OPCW.
616.   A further addition is near the end of this paragraph where "the Conference decides" that
the State Party has undertaken the necessary action.   In the CTBT the decision of the
Conference concerns the restriction or suspension;  in the CWC no decision is explicitly
provided for, although the condition for such measures to be lifted is the same -- "undertakes
the necessary action to conform with its obligations" -- as that on which the Conference is
called to take a decision in the Protocol.
Article V Paragraph 3
17.  This paragraph corresponds to paragraph 3 of Article XII of the CWC and to paragraph 3
of Article V of the CTBT.   It prefers the "serious damage" of the CWC to the mere
"damage" of the CTBT but follows the CTBT in using the word "non-compliance" instead of
the CWC's "activities prohibited under this Convention."  The final words of this paragraph --
"and designed to ensure the fulfilment of the object and purpose of the Convention." -- are not
in the CWC or the CTBT.  They usefully serve to emphasise the centrality of the Convention,
which the Protocol is designed to strengthen.
18.  The phrase "in particular Article I of the Convention" is also found in paragraph 3 of
Article XIII of the CWC but has no equivalent in the CTBT.   The parallel with the CWC at
this point is important.  Although the BTWC does not have titled Articles, the content of its
Article I corresponds to the "General Obligations" Article I of the CWC.   The gravest
breaches of either Convention are likely to consist of a failure to comply with one or other of
the general obligations set out in Article I.   These general obligations, in the case of the
BTWC, have been clarified and interpreted in the Final Declarations of successive Review
Conferences;  in particular, since the Fourth Review Conference in 1996 when the Final
Declaration6 in respect of Article I stated that:
The Conference reaffirms that the use by the States Parties, in any way and under
any circumstances, of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, that is not
consistent with prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, is effectively a
violation of Article I of the Convention. [Emphasis added],
there can have been no remaining doubt that any use of biological or toxin weapons would
involve a breach of Article I.
19.  Square brackets currently remain in this paragraph in respect of the choice of adjective
[collective] [joint] to qualify the "measures" which the Conference may recommend to States
Parties.  Collective is the adjective to be found in the CWC and the CTBT.   It is favoured as
signalling severity:  that the measures are to be no less severe than those which might be
recommended by the respective Conferences under the CWC and the CTBT.   It indicates that
the measures are the product of collective counsel:  that they are organised.  To substitute a
different adjective might be taken as an indication of a weakening of severity and
organisation by comparison with the treaties of 1993 and of 1996.
20.  However, collective also has a certain resonance for those States which have become
unhappy with the collective measures taken by, or under the authority of, resolutions of the
UN Security Council.   Such States prefer the adjective joint.   They would like this Article to
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7envisage "joint measures", a phrase which would be more acceptable to some for being free
of the Security Council associations of "collective measures", but which for that very reason
is unacceptable to others.
21.  "Cooperative measures" was proposed by the Friend of the Chair in the strikethrough
text in Part II7 as a compromise formulation.   This has much merit.  It bridges the gap
between collective and joint and is politically neutral.
22.  Should, however, even the word cooperative prove unacceptable, consideration might be
given to the radical possibility of having no adjective to qualify "measures" at all.   States
Parties could then choose for themselves whether to regard the measures recommended to
them by the Conference in any particular case as collective, joint or cooperative.
23.  In this regard, it is noted that the UN Charter8 uses "measures" without any adjective in
the powers of recommendation conferred on the General Assembly in Article 14 as well as
those conferred on the Security Council in Article 39.
Article V Paragraph 4
24.  This paragraph corresponds to paragraph 4 of Article XII of the CWC and to paragraph 4
of Article V of the CTBT, but with significant differences.  The CWC has "The Conference
shall in cases of particular gravity bring the issue" but the CTBT prefers "The Conference,
or alternatively, if the case is urgent, the Executive Council, may bring the issue".   The
Protocol here follows the CTBT in its drafting, although restoring the concept of gravity from
the CWC.  For a case to have to be "particularly grave and urgent" means that two criteria
have to satisfied before the Executive Council can act under this provision.  In the absence of
both gravity and urgency in combination, the Executive Council cannot act but the
Conference still can.
25.  Although the empowerment of the Executive Council at this point marks a departure
from the equivalent provision of the CWC, it should be borne in mind that there was a reason
for the absence of any mention of the OPCW Executive Council in paragraph 4 of Article XII
of the CWC9.  This is because the CWC in Article VIII paragraph 36 which provides inter
alia that:
The Executive Council shall, in cases of particular gravity and urgency, bring the
issue or matter, including relevant information and conclusions, directly to the
attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security
Council.
does already empower the Executive Council to refer matters directly to the United Nations.
The exercise of this power requires the same 'trigger' event, satisfying the criteria of gravity
and urgency in combination.
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826.  The Protocol in paragraph 34 of Article IX The Organization contains closely similar
language that:
The Executive Council may, in cases of particular gravity and urgency, bring the
issue or matter, including relevant information and conclusions, directly to the
attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security
Council.
27.  The difference between the draft Protocol and the CWC is accordingly less sharp than a
comparison of the Measures to Redress Articles alone might suggest.
28.   The remaining square brackets in paragraph 4 concern the question of whether -- and, if
so, how -- to specify the UN organs which are to have "the issue, including relevant
information and conclusions" brought to their attention.
29.  There is a case for specifying the Security Council, as the organ on which Member States
of the United Nations confer "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security" (Article 24 of the UN Charter), and the organ to which States Parties to
the BTWC10 entrust responsibilities both for the initiation of investigations into complaints
(Article VI of the BTWC) and for the organization of assistance by States Parties in solidarity
with victims (Article VII of the BTWC).   Since the Protocol is concerned explicitly here with
incidents of non-compliance with BTWC obligations, and not just Protocol obligations, it
would be strange if there were no mention here of the Security Council.
30.  On the other hand, the General Assembly is the plenary organ of the United Nations and
has had a long involvement with the history of the BTWC.   It presents a more attractive
aspect to many BTWC States Parties anxious to protect the attributes of sovereignty from the
relatively interventionist Security Council, and critical of the Council's restricted membership
including the role of the Permanent Members.
31.  One solution would be to adopt the formulation in paragraph 4 of Article XII of the
CWC, also found in paragraph 36 of that Convention's Article VIII as noted above:
"to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations
Security Council."
This would be consistent with the provision already incorporated into paragraph 34 of Article
IX of the Protocol.
32.  Another solution would be to follow paragraph 4 of Article V of the CTBT:
"to the attention of the United Nations."
which is the option adopted by the Friend of the Chair in the strikethrough text version in Part
II.   At present the square brackets in Article V of the Protocol include two other variants:
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9"to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly or the United Nations
Security Council."
and
"to the attention of relevant organs of the United Nations."
In evaluating these variants, it is assumed that it would be political unacceptable, at this stage
in the negotiation of the Protocol, to include the Security Council explicitly without an
equally explicit mention of the General Assembly, and vice versa.  It would be desirable to
look to the future, and to find a formulation which can survive into an era, after the Protocol
has entered into force, when the particular strains and stresses in relations between the
Security Council and the General Assembly which characterised the United Nations of the
1990s are receding into the past.  This suggests that, in order to build in the necessary
flexibility, the most inclusive formulation is to be preferred, as in the CWC and in Article IX
of the Protocol:
"to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations
Security Council."
or, failing that, the CTBT alternative recommended by the Friend of the Chair in the
strikethrough text:
"to the attention of the United Nations."
Strikethrough Text for Article V
33.  Our view is that the language in Article V should be consistent with Article IX of the
Protocol and thus that Article V should read:
ARTICLE V
MEASURES TO REDRESS A SITUATION AND TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE
1. The Conference shall take the necessary measures, in accordance with paragraphs
2, 3 and 4, to ensure compliance with the Convention and this Protocol and to redress
and remedy any situation which contravenes their provisions. In considering action
pursuant to this paragraph, the Conference shall take into account all information
and recommendations on the issues submitted by the Executive Council.
2. In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Conference or by the
Executive Council, taking into account their respective powers and functions, to take
measures to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its compliance, and
where the State Party fails to fulfil the request within the specified time, the
Conference may, upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, inter alia,
restrict or suspend the State Party’s rights and privileges under this Protocol until the
Conference decides it has undertaken the necessary action to conform with its
obligations under the Convention and this Protocol.
3. In cases where serious damage to the object and purpose of the Convention may
result from non-compliance with the provisions of the Convention or this Protocol, in
10
particular Article I of the Convention, the Conference may recommend to States
Parties cooperative [collective] [joint] measures which are in conformity with
international law and designed to ensure the fulfilment of the object and purpose of
the Convention.
4. The Conference or, alternatively, if the case is particularly grave and urgent, the
Executive Council, may bring the issue, including relevant information and
conclusions, to the attention of the  [ General Assembly [  and ] [or] the Security
Council of the  ] [relevant organs of the]   United Nations.
